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Abstract
Zhang Guan liang is a Chinese agricultural entrepreneur, who lives in Fuyang, China. In 2009, he founded
North Branch River Vegetable Cooperative, with a vision of creating a vegetable production and distribution
entity of significant scale. He has successfully launched the venture, with more than 200 farmers producing
vegetables for it. Today, he faces significant challenges to further growth; some common to entrepreneurs,
others unique to agriculture, and others unique to growing an agricultural venture in China. The case charts
Zhang's efforts to increase production capacity, access growth capital, and manage food safety issues. In a
larger sense, the case charts the agrifood supply chain struggles that are particularly acute in China today.
Keywords
teaching case, China, smallholder agriculture, cooperative, agricultural entrepreneurship
Disciplines
Economics
This working paper is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_workingpapers/86
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	  
	  
IOWA	  STATE	  UNIVERSITY	  
Department	  of	  Economics	  
Ames,	  Iowa,	  50011-­‐1070	  
 
Iowa	  State	  University	  does	  not	  discriminate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race,	  color,	  age,	  religion,	  national	  origin,	  sexual	  orientation,	  
gender	  identity,	  genetic	  information,	  sex,	  marital	  status,	  disability,	  or	  status	  as	  a	  U.S.	  veteran.	  Inquiries	  can	  be	  directed	  
to	  the	  Director	  of	  Equal	  Opportunity	  and	  Compliance,	  3280	  Beardshear	  Hall,	  (515)	  294-­‐7612.	  
 
Scaling Up from Smallholder Agriculture in China,
North Branch River Vegetable Cooperative
 Kevin Kimle, Hongdong Guo
Working Paper No. 12028
December 2012
 Scaling Up from Smallholder Agriculture in 
China, North Branch River Vegetable 
Cooperative 
A Teaching Case 
 
 
 
 
Kevin Kimle 
Hongdong Guo 
December 2012 
Department of Economics Working Paper # 12028 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 50011 
 
Kevin Kimle is the Rastetter Chair of Agricultural Entrepreneurship, Lecturer in the Department 
of Economics, and Director of the Agricultural Entrepreneurship Initiative at Iowa State 
University.  Hongdong Guo is Professor, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, 
Zhejiang University, China. 
Funding support for development of this case study was provided by the Agricultural 
Entrepreneurship Initiative at Iowa State University, the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
International Science and Education (ISE) Competitive Grants Program, and the National Science 
Foundation of China (71073136).  
 
 
 
 
Zhang Guan liang is a Chinese agricultural entrepreneur, who lives in Fuyang, China. In 2009, he 
founded North Branch River Vegetable Cooperative, with a vision of creating a vegetable 
production and distribution entity of significant scale.  He has successfully launched the 
venture, with more than 200 farmers producing vegetables for it.  Today, he faces significant 
challenges to further growth; some common to entrepreneurs, others unique to agriculture, 
and others unique to growing an agricultural venture in China.  The case charts Zhang’s efforts 
to increase production capacity, access growth capital, and manage food safety issues.  In a 
larger sense, the case charts the agrifood supply chain struggles that are particularly acute in 
China today. 
Background 
Zhang Guan liang was born to peasant farmers in Fuyang, China.  In 1998, after completing high 
school, he moved to the city in hopes of building a better life away from the farm. “I spent too 
much time having fun in high school to earn the grades necessary to enter university,” Zhang 
says with a smile.  “At that time, it seemed the only way to make a living was to find a job 
somewhere away from my home.  Many young people had left before me, and seemed to have 
found ways to earn a living beyond the opportunities available here.” 
Zhang was part of a great migration of China’s population from rural to urban areas.  The 
proportion of China’s population living in urban areas has risen from 35 percent in 1998, the 
time of Zhang’s graduation from high school, to about 50 percent today.  The China National 
Bureau of Statistics estimates that there are today more than 140 million rural-urban migrants 
in China, the vast majority being young people striking out to find economic opportunity as 
Zhang had. 
Zhang joined a government-owned company repairing roads and performing small 
maintenance and infrastructure projects. Three years later the company was privatized and 
wages were slashed, forcing him to find another employer. He found work as a salesman for a 
company specializing in dyes.  “It is very difficult for laborers to find opportunities for 
developing their skills as a way to higher wages and better jobs,” comments Zhang.   
In 2003, Zhang was married and moved back to his hometown where his new wife worked as 
an English teacher. He worked for a wooden crate manufacturer for five years until the 
company was forced to close its doors. The company’s only client, a paper producer, was shut 
down for failing to adhere to the government’s environmental standards.  
 
Figure 1. Zhang Guan liang by greenhouse.  
The Start 
“At that point, I decided I wanted to start a business,” said Zhang.  “Being dependent on an 
employer for my pay hadn’t worked out for me.  I wasn’t paid that much anyway, so I thought 
that I might as well identify a way to create my own income.  I enjoy working with people, and 
think I have good communication and sales skills so why not start a business?” 
Zhang’s decision to pursue an entrepreneurial path is not unique, but entrepreneurship in the 
context of a modern economy is a newer and evolving phenomenon in China.  Reforms to 
China’s socialist policies starting in 1978 gave way to the beginnings of private entities, though 
often positioned as collectively-owned enterprises.  Further policy changes 1988 gave rise to 
enterprises more recognizable as private-sector, entrepreneurial ventures, and the number of 
private enterprises grew by 20 to 30 percent annually from that time through the early 1990s 
(National Administration of Industry and Commerce, 2003).  Private enterprises have become a 
major driving force in the contemporary Chinese economy, and private entrepreneurs as a new 
social class are attracting enormous interest across the Chinese society (Chen, Li, and Matlay 
2006). 
Though the social status of entrepreneurs has drastically improved, and private or quasi-private 
enterprises have become engines of economic growth, there are still significant challenges to 
starting and running an enterprise relative to other countries.   The World Bank’s Doing 
Business report ranks China 151st in its starting a business category for 2012, below Hong Kong 
(2), Singapore (4), Taiwan (16), South Korea (24), and Vietnam (98).  Indicators that underlie this 
ranking include an average of 14 procedures needed to start a business (compared to 5 the 
average of OECD countries) taking 38 days (12 days OECD) in total.   There are also significant 
challenges related to intellectual property, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets and an 
overall lack of legal and regulatory transparency.   
Despite the challenges of losing his job, having little savings, and the general challenges to 
starting a business, Zhang forged ahead in 2009.  “I wanted to start a business near where I 
lived,” he recalls.  “I also wanted to have a business that could grow, even if it was going to take 
much time and work.”  
Zhang’s home is Fuyang, a county-level city with a population of approximately 650,000 under 
jurisdiction of Hangzhou, the provincial capital of Zhejiang province, located about three hours 
southwest of Shanghai by car.   
Zhejiang province stands out for its entrepreneurial activity and growth.  In Zhejiang, the 
private sector has developed at a greater speed than most others, with private enterprises 
making up more than two-thirds of the provincial economy (Zhang et al., 2003). 
Zhang thought about construction.  Home and commercial property construction continues to 
boom in Fuyang, and Zhang had some experience.  “A construction business was a thought,” 
comments Zhang.  “It seems that many who try to start construction service businesses end up 
as not much more than laborers, so it didn’t seem an attractive alternative.  I hadn’t developed 
any special skills or ideas for how to stand apart from other enterprises, so I wasn’t sure I could 
effectively compete.  At least it didn’t seem like a business where I could get a return much 
greater than an hourly wage.” 
Zhang very quickly focused in on agriculture as his opportunity.  “I fled farming after high 
school,” Zhang says with a grin.  “But there has been such a change since then.  More people 
live in larger cities and shop for their food in supermarkets.  This creates a need for better 
production systems to deliver food products in a more professional manner.” 
Supermarket chains have expanded rapidly in Chinese cities.  This contrasts with past food 
retail markets that were highly localized.  Supermarket chains are not only established in large 
coastal cities, but now into interior and smaller cities as well as historically rural areas.   
Global grocery superpower Walmart entered the Chinese market in 1996 and now operates a 
number of formats and banners in China including Supercenters, Sam’s Clubs, and 
Neighborhood Markets. As of March 1, 2012, Walmart owned 370 units in 140 cities in 21 
provinces and four municipalities, and had 106,500 employees across China. 
 
Figure 2. North Branch Vegetable Cooperative Production.  
The emergence of a higher proportion of food purchases coming from supermarkets, 
restaurants and convenience stores is indicative of a higher proportion of Chinese consumers, 
with a well-earned reputation for frugality in food purchases, having a willingness to pay more 
for food products.   
“More consumers want foods that are convenient, safe, and good quality,” said Zhang.  “As 
supermarkets continue to grow in popularity, my thought was that there is a significant 
opportunity to develop a brand that would be known for consistent quality and safety.  
Agriculture and the food industry in China have been given a bad name by the melamine 
scandal and other food safety and quality issues.  If I can establish a business with a reputation 
and brand for high quality, there is great opportunity for growth.  Supermarkets have an 
interest in standardized quality and safety, but there needs to be capacity for delivering that 
from the farm.”   
The Chinese grocery sector will continue its fast growth over the next few years to hit sales of 
almost $1.5 trillion by 2015, according to grocery industry researchers IGD (IGD 2012).  The 
group pegged Chinese grocery sector sales at $954 billion in 2011, moving past the U.S. market 
at $913 billion. 
In early 2009, Zhang narrowed in on his start-up opportunity, a vegetable production business 
that could scale-up to do business with large supermarkets.  “The primary challenge I have to 
overcome is scale,” said Zhang.  “Growing vegetables in Zhejiang (Province) is no trick, but the 
hard part is developing the production capacity for delivering large quantities of consistent, 
high quality product.  There are no big tractors here,” he comments while smiling at the 
American co-author.   
China faces significant constraints in its agricultural land capacity relative to its population size.  
China has approximately 300 million acres of arable land, covering 13 percent of its territory. 
This amounts to 0.67 acres per capita, less than 40 percent of the world per capita average, 
one-eighth the U.S. level, and one half of India. China has 22 percent of world total population, 
but only 7 percent of arable land. 
 “Agricultural land here is set up in very small plots and is mostly cultivated by households,” 
adds Zhang. “The average farmer cultivates about one and half to two mu (about one third 
acre), sometimes in different plots and usually to a number of crops.  The land is owned 
collectively by the villages, and farmers can’t sell the land.  But the people do have land-use 
rights that can be traded or rented.”  
With these land tenure issues in mind, Zhang knew he needed to develop a business that could 
enlist the support and participation of others who had access to land and production capacity.  
“The first thing I knew I needed was the ability to produce at higher quantities,” he comments.  
“I began to meet with farmers who I knew that I thought might have an interest in being a part 
of something bigger.” 
Zhang met individually and in small groups with neighboring farmers.  He described his longer 
term vision of an enterprise that would focus on production and delivery of high quality 
vegetables to large supermarket buyers.   
“Farmers are used to working alone,” commented Zhang.  “They work hard to earn money from 
their small plots of land, so ideas of change can be difficult to accept.” 
Zhang spoke to the farmers about trends in consumer markets that were creating opportunities 
for larger-scale production.  He brainstormed with them about specializing in various vegetable 
crops, working to gain access to better seeds and genetics, and about how to create a 
staggered production schedule that would result in a more steady supply of products to 
customers. 
Structuring the Business 
Eventually eight other farmers agreed to start work with Zhang on the launch of the new 
business.  “Relationships are important, so the early commitments I gained were from those 
farmers that I knew who had some trust that I would work hard to make the business succeed.” 
Zhang had already begun to explore structuring the business as a cooperative.  “As I spoke with 
local officials about starting a business, more and more of the discussions turned toward 
formation of a farmer cooperative.” 
The term ‘cooperative’ has had varying meanings in agriculture in the last several decades in 
China, and government has played varying roles in their development.  In recent years legal 
reforms and intensifying levels of aid have contributed to the emergence of form of agricultural 
cooperative that would be more recognizable to those familiar with U.S. and European 
cooperatives.   
Deng, Huang, Xu, and Rozelle (2010) label the more recently emerging organizations in China as 
“farmer professional cooperatives.”  Farmer professional Cooperatives in China are more like 
cooperatives elsewhere in the world and include organizations that supply inputs, manage 
production and promote technology as well as those that are engaged primarily with 
marketing.  
The emergence of these newer farmer cooperatives has accelerated since 2006, when a law 
was passed providing further support for their formation (Sonntag, Huang, Rozelle, & Skerritt, 
2005).  This national law gave confidence to the officials that were charged with promoting 
farmer cooperatives that their mission was in sync with the nation's development efforts.  It 
also gave formal legal status to farmer cooperatives such that they could act as business 
entities. 
By March 2009, Zhang had found persuaded eight farmers to join him in founding North Branch 
River Vegetable Cooperative.  “The nine of us certainly didn’t have enough land or expertise to 
do anything too big,” said Zhang.  “But we needed a place to start, and the important thing was 
setting up an organization positioned for the future.” 
“It is important to have the support of local officials,” continued Zhang.  “The new law related 
to cooperatives gave them added motivation to support the development of North Branch 
River Vegetable Cooperative.  It also has given us some advantages related to taxes and tolls, 
and access to some start-up capital.” 
 
First Efforts 
“Our first efforts were around building coordination in production and marketing of common 
vegetables,” said Zhang.  “My eye has always been on development of a brand, so we 
registered North Branch River Vegetable Cooperative as a trademark and began to work 
immediately on how to achieve volumes of consistent, high quality vegetables.” 
Zhang learned quickly in 2009 that coordination of even a few relatively small farmers was a 
challenge.  “We all had our own ideas on which seeds to use for both yield and quality.   We had 
to learn to measure more carefully and to more carefully note consumer preferences.  Even 
coordinating a planting and production schedule took a lot of learning.” 
Ultimately, the first farmers in North Branch River Vegetable Cooperative (NBRVC) yielded to 
Zhang’s larger vision.  “We all understood that we were working toward something larger,” he 
said.  “The technical standards we developed for production and harvesting were not just for 
ourselves, but were about testing and building systems for a larger organization.” 
Zhang and eight other founders of the cooperative invested 10,000 yuan each initially, while 
one hundred twelve other farmers invested 100 yuan each.  The cooperative is governed by a 
Board of Directors elected by members.   
Growing the Enterprise 
By late in 2009, Zhang and his early group of farmer members were engaged in early activity.  
They focused on ramping up production of leafy vegetables, working through the many details 
of a more coordinated method of production.  “We would work through a list of questions and 
issues each day as we got started,” commented Zhang.  “By day’s end, however, we would have 
generated an even longer list of questions!” 
The group underwent ‘pollution-free’ production training, a designation based on a program 
administered by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture.  The program’s inception was 2001, as the 
government launched the Action Plan for Pollution-free Agricultural Products.  The focus of the 
program is on food safety and food quality.  
Fresh vegetables were the first crops covered by the plan, and the Ministry of Agriculture 
developed a series of standards for vegetables to carry the pollution-free label.  The standards 
for the pollution-free certification products are compulsory.  Two other certification schemes - 
namely Green Food and Organic Food - are voluntary. 
“Products sold locally in less formal markets may not worry about pollution free certification,” 
commented Zhang.  “But we needed to start from this point because of our plans to sell 
through supermarkets and other more organized markets.” 
NBRVC sales channels are split up into three parts.  Wholesale markets account currently for 
about 75 percent of total sales, 15 percent is supermarket sales, and 10 percent is sold directly 
to consumers.  “With more widespread adoption of Internet shopping we have been 
experimenting with sales of high-end fruits and vegetables,” comments Zhang.  “We see this 
type of direct sales activity growing along with supermarket sales.” 
 Vegetable production in China has expanded significantly during the past three decades.  
Vegetable-production area in China has grown from about 3 million hectares in 1980 to almost 
20 million hectares today.  China has transitioned from barely visible in international markets to 
that of a leading exporter of fruit and vegetables. 
Leading vegetables produced in China include cabbage, cucumber, radish and tomato.  The top 
10 vegetable producing provinces (out of a total of 31) account for 70 percent of the total 
national output, with Zhejiang Province being one of them.  Other leading production regions 
include Shangdong, Hebei, Henan, Hubei and Guangdong.  
Planted Area for Main Crops – China 
 
Figure 3. USDA Agricultural Baseline Projections. 
The combination of strong domestic consumption growth and continued growth in exports are 
predicted to fuel investment in vegetable production.  Technology has contributed substantially 
to the growth of Chinese vegetable production.  For example, greenhouse production has 
moved from less than 10,000 hectares in 1980 to something approaching 3 million hectares 
today.   
 
By early 2010, Zhang’s work to coordinate with local officials began to pay off in that a special 
trade area was established for NBRVC products. This was done to expand and develop brand 
name recognition in Fu yang’s east market.  
“We needed credibility early, and that is difficult for a new business,” commented Zhang.  “The 
support of the local officials was important in signaling to potential buyers that we were real.  
 
Figure 4. Vegetable Demand in China. 
There is also the potential for some financial support from local government as we invest in 
greenhouse facilities.” 
In June and September 2010, Fu yang TV had two special news reports on NBRVC’s goods, 
which raised the profile of the fledging venture.  In August, NBRVC signed an agreement with 
Wumei Supermarket to supply vegetables. 
“The market opportunities opened up pretty quickly,” said Zhang.  “We started adding new 
farmer members at a faster rate than expected.” 
Zhang and his founding members set up ambitious goals for NBRVC for 2010.  They included: 
1. Set up 1200 square meters (.35 acres) of large greenhouse awnings for testing new 
seeds and sustainable production methods. 
2. Construct 500 square meters of space for vegetable processing. 
3. Drive members to establish 100 mu (16.5 acres) of greenhouse awnings. 
4. Reach 12,000,000 RMB (US $1.8M) in sales. 
5. Establish seed/variety test projects with Zhejiang Institute of Agricultural Sciences, 
Hangzhou Institute of Agricultural Sciences and others. 
“We were able to reach our goals for 2010, even as we struggled with all kinds of issues,” 
commented Zhang. 
 
 
The Competitive Environment 
The vegetable industry in China has grown significantly.  Growth in income has led to rapid 
increases in vegetable consumption, with China ranking top in the world in consumption of 
fresh vegetables.  
Vegetable production has grown in tandem with consumption.  Although the sown area for 
vegetables accounts for only less than 10 percent total crop area in China, its accounts for more 
than 30 percent of the total agricultural production value.  In addition, vegetable processing has 
grown significantly.   
The average scale of vegetable production is very small, and driven by the small size of 
landholdings for households.  Farms that produce vegetables in China range in size from 0.2 to 
0.3 hectares.  
In more marginal vegetable production areas, vegetable production typically is part of a 
rotation with other crops with very minor scale.  Marketing is not an important activity in these 
areas as production is primarily aimed at meeting household and local demand. 
More intensive vegetable production areas do find larger scale, specialized operations, though 
often their production capacity doesn’t exceeds 10 hectares.  Only in the last three years has 
China begun to see emergence of more scaled enterprises, with access to regional and export 
markets, and utilizing the latest production and greenhouse technologies.   
“It was after I started meeting with supermarkets and other large vegetable distributors that I 
realized there were other producers that were far ahead of me,” commented Zhang.  I have 
now visited operations that have many hectares under greenhouse, have very nice processing 
facilities, and are selling their products not only across China but often into export markets as 
well.” 
“One worry I had initially,” adds Zhang, “was that we wouldn’t sell our production.  The thought 
of increasing NBRVC vegetable production and then watching it go rotten for lack of a market 
outlet was a big concern.” 
“My concern was in the wrong place.  We have always been able to sell our vegetable 
production.  The important issue is price.  We have a high quality product and deliver it fresh, 
but there are others who do the same and margins are very difficult to maintain.” 
Zhang notes the emergence of well-capitalized vegetable production and processing operations 
with access to capital.  “Operations connected to national or multi-national companies have 
been able to ramp up production very quickly.  They have been able to access large tracts of 
land, construct world-class greenhouses, and move to large scale production in a very short 
period of time.” 
Differentiation 
NBRVC produces vegetables under the pollution-free food standards, but so do better-
capitalized competitors.  These standards encompass:  
1. Environmental quality standards in the production fields such as air quality, water 
quality and soil quality. 
2. Production technology. 
3. Both primary product and processed product qualities. 
4. Packaging, labeling, storage and transportation. 
The Ministry of Agriculture administers about 40 are pollution-free vegetable standards, though 
there can also be local standards for pollution-free certification.  
“We’re happy to have achieved pollution-free certification,” said Zhang.  “But it seems that is 
more of a necessity just for doing business with major market outlets, rather than a means of 
setting ourselves apart from the competition.” 
Zhang and his fellow NBRVC producers pride themselves on the no-pollution certification, and 
also on using a high proportion of organic fertilizer and limited pesticides and insecticides.   
“We use manure from a local dairy, though we are asking many questions among ourselves 
about it as it costs more than synthetic fertilizer.  When we are competing on price it makes it 
difficult to continue with higher cost inputs.” 
“We continue to debate moving toward fully organic production,” adds Zhang.  “As producers 
we worry about the risk of exposing our crops to disease and pests, but perhaps it’s the better 
opportunity for distinguishing our brand in the market.  There are certainly examples of organic 
products that command a premium in the marketplace.” 
Scaling the Enterprise 
In spite of intense competition, by 2012 Zhang finds that the enterprise has continued to grow.  
NBRVC has more than 80 farmer members, and nearly 200 non-members involved in vegetable 
production, processing, and sales.  Production occurs on about 300 mu ( approximately 50 
acres). 
The cooperative now has a processing facility, though little equipment or refrigeration. Cleaning 
and packaging of vegetables after harvest occurs in the processing facility under the standards 
developed by Zhang.  Transportation to end-customers has developed, enabling timely delivery 
of fresh vegetables. 
NBRVC now organizes efforts to guide members on planting methods, seed selection, crop 
selection, timing of planting and harvest, and other important aspects of a scaled vegetable 
operation.  The cooperative works to arrange use of ‘low-impact’ fertilizers (manure from local 
dairy cows), trains producers on pesticides usage, as well as on proper stewardship of irrigation 
water from the nearby North Branch River.  
Zhang’s expressed concerns about NBRVC center on sustainable growth of the enterprise.  “We 
have ambitious goals for continued growth,” he says.  “But is the cooperative really positioned 
to achieve that?” 
Zhang and his Board developed goals for 2015 that include the following items. 
1. Establish 300 mu (50 acres) of greenhouse production, with an additional 1,000 mu 
(~170 acres) of uncovered vegetable production. 
2. Establish a 2,000 square meter (0.5 acres) test plots, grow seedlings in greenhouses, 
and develop 500 square meters of vegetable cold storage in processing facility. 
3. Establish distributed delivery capabilities to enable online orders and direct delivery 
to homes, businesses and schools. 
4. Develop services for use of agricultural machinery and agronomic consulting. 
5. Develop new marketing services including customer tours and self-picking areas. 
6. Develop further processing capabilities for new products such as dehydrated 
vegetables, vegetable drinks, and health-care vegetable products. 
When Zhang is asked about the biggest constraints to achieving these goals his answer is quick.  
“Capital.  As a cooperative we’ve had access to loans for working capital at relatively low 
interest rates, but capital for investing in growth is much more difficult to obtain.  Tight margins 
mean that we haven’t been able to build a significant base of capital from operations.” 
In addition, Zhang worries about the demographics of the farmer members of NBRVC and those 
other farmers that serve as suppliers.  “Many farmers are of the older generation, and few of 
them have children willing to carry on the farm business.  Fast change is a challenge, and 
introduction of concepts like organic production is difficult.”   
Finally, Zhang looks at the nearby highway and wonders about NBRVC’s location.  “We’re close 
to Hangzhou.” (population 8.7 million)  “Land like this, so close to a major city, is at greater risk 
of being used for purposes other than agriculture such as manufacturing.  In addition, labor 
costs are rising here more rapidly than other areas because of so many jobs in Hangzhou.  This 
puts us at a disadvantage compared to more remote, larger scale vegetable producers.”   
 
Discussion Questions 
1. As Zhang attempts to expand the scope and scale of his cooperative, what are the 
primary obstacles to growth?  
2. How can NBRVC differentiate itself in the marketplace?  What strategy best lends 
itself to long term success? 
3. What expertise outside that of Zhang may be needed for NBRVC to grow?   
4. What are the strengths and weaknesses of NBRVC’s cooperative structure? 
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